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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of the Industrial Commission 
(now the Utah Labor Commission) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(6) (1997)).1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Labor Commission erred in interpreting and applying Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1997), that a finding of permanent disability under § 34A-2-413 (10) is 
not subject to any of the other provisions contain in 34A-2-413. The Court of Appeals 
reviews the Commission's interpretation of § 34A-2-413 under a correction-of-error standard. 
E.g., Crapo v. Industrial Commission, 922 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); See also Luckau 
v. Board of Review. 840 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(7) which, defines the time period that 
an employer is required to pay permanent disability benefits, based upon a final order of the 
Commission, applies in all cases of permanent disability, including a final order determined 
by subsection (10). The Court of Appeals reviews the Commission's interpretation of § 34A-
2-413 under a correction-of-error standard. E.g.. Crapo v. Industrial Commission. 922 P.2d 
39 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); See also Luckau v. Board of Review. 840 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
!The entire Utah Workers' Compensation Act was repealed and recodified effective July 1,1997, 
and the Industrial Commission was replaced by the Labor Commission. This brief refers primarily 
to the Act as it was in effect on September 28, 1998, the date of the applicant's claimed injury. In 
addition, the brief refers to the "Industrial Commission," or simply the "Commission." 
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APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. S34A-2-413. See Addendum for entire section. 
Utah Code Ann. S34A-2-413(7). 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently 
totally disabled,, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and 
evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally 
disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least 
minimum wage provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would 
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and 
accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work 
provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may 
reduce the employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's 
income in excess of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a 
permanently totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work 
subject to the offset provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset, 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is governed by 
Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that 
medically appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the 
employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and 
residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total 
disability benefits as provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically 
appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but the employee has 
failed to fully cooperate. 
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Utah Code Ann. S34A-2-413(10). 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both 
feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total 
and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Introduction 
This is a Petition for Review of an Order by the Utah Labor Commission denying 
Respondents1 Motion for Review. The facts are basically uncontested. The applicant, Kyle 
Stephens suffered an industrial accident on September 8, 1998, which resulted in the 
amputation of both legs just below the knee. (R. 88). In accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413(10), it was found that the applicant was permanent and totally disabled. Soon 
after the applicant's accident, the respondents had a vocational rehabilitation counselor 
review the applicant's potential to return to work. (R. 89). Sometime in 1999, the applicant 
began going to college, taking courses in computer electronics, at the expenses of the 
respondents. (R. 89). 
On or about September 28,1999, the respondents offered the applicant a job with his 
prior employer. It was indicated by the applicant at the hearing that he would be able to 
perform the job, however, he reported that he wanted to finish his schooling. (R. 89). 
Based upon the uncontested facts that the applicant has been offered a job that fits within his 
abilities and one which both the applicant and the employer testified could be performed by 
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the applicant, the issue we are faced with is whether disability benefits are "suspended" in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(7). 
II. Procedural History 
The Appellee, Kyle Stephens (the "applicant") instituted these proceedings before the 
Labor Commission of Utah on July 8, 1999, when he filed an Application for Hearing 
seeking workers1 compensation benefits from his employer, Intermountain Slurry Seal, and 
its insurer, for the injuries he sustained on September 8,1998. (R. 2). This was done in spite 
of the fact that Intermountain Slurry Seal had been making disability payments along with 
paying for the applicant's schooling and had in no respects contested the claim prior to the 
filing of the application for hearing. Thereafter, the matter went to a hearing in front of the 
Honorable Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge, on November 29, 1999. (R. 77). 
Following the hearing, Judge Elicerio issued a Preliminary Conclusions of Law and Order. 
(Attached hereto as Addendum 2.) Thereafter, a second hearing was held on June 8,2000, 
wherein Judge Elicerio issued her Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
holding that it is irrelevant whether or not the applicant is able to return to work in those 
cases that apply subsection (10) in determining permanent disability. (R. 88) 
Respondent Intermountain Slurry Seal filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission on January 4, 2001. (R. 103-109). The Commission, on February 28, 2001 
entered an Order, denying Intermountain's Motion for Review. (R. 116-118). Mrs. 
Schreiber filed a Petition for Review on March 23, 2001. 
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III. Uncontested Facts 
The facts are essentially uncontested. The applicant, Kyle Stephens suffered an 
industrial accident on September 8, 1998 which result in the amputation of both legs just 
below the knee. (R. 88). Following the accident, the Respondents began paying disability 
benefits to the applicant, and have done so continuously. It has been determined that the 
applicant is permanently disabled because of the loss of both legs in accordance with §34A-
2-413(10). (R. 88). It is also uncontested that a job has been provided to the applicant that 
fits within his abilities and a job that the applicant testified at the hearing he would be 
capable of performing. (R. 89). 
Soon after the applicant's accident, the respondents had a vocational rehabilitation 
counselor review the applicant's potential to return to work. (R. 89). Following the 
vocational rehabilitation review, sometime in 1999, the applicant began going to college, 
taking courses in computer electronics, with the respondents paying for the schooling. (R. 
89). In addition, the applicant was offered a full-time dispatcher job by his employer. The 
dispatching job had a salary of approximately $2,000 per month, and was a job that fit within 
the applicant's restrictions. The applicant testified at the hearing that he thought he would 
be able to do the job. (R. 89). At the time the jobs were offered to the applicant, he reported 
that he wanted to finish his schooling. (R. 89). At no time has the finding of permanent 
disability been challenged, rather the question involves the suspension of benefits during the 
time that the applicant is capable to perform regular steady work as set forth in §34-2-413(7). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The conflict in this case comes when reviewing Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(10). 
That section in essence states that the loss of permanent and complete loss of use of both 
feet... constitutes total and permanent disability to be compensated according to this section. 
Subsection b of that section states "finding of permanent and total disability pursuant to 
Subsection 10(a) is final." 
In this case, the Labor Commission found that since the finding is to be final, that 
permanent total disability payments must continue until the death of the employee regardless 
of his ability to return to regular steady work. 
It is the Respondents' position that even though the finding is to be final, subsection 
10 states that the applicant is to receive compensation in accordance with the other provisions 
of the statute. Therefore, in order to determine the duration of payments of a final order as 
determined by subsection 10 payment ends at death or when the applicant is able to return 
to regular steady work. This is clearly the intent of the legislature as it included specific 
language in subsection 10. 
Subsection 7 of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413 defines how long the compensation 
payments are to be made. This subsection applies to every case that has had a finding of 
permanent disability. It is further the Respondents' position that Subsection 10(b) making 
a finding of permanent total disability, pursuant to Subsection 10(a) final does not extend the 
period of time in which payment shall be made. Clearly, Subsection 7(a)(i) is not affected 
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by the nature of the disability, and payments would clearly cease upon the death of the 
employee. Subsection 7(a)(ii) also has the same affect. In other words, when an employee 
is capable of returning to regular steady work, the payments also cease regardless of the 
disability. The fact that an employee has lost both of his feet is not an indication in all cases 
that he cannot work. The facts of this case show that the Respondents offered work that the 
employee could do based upon his physical and mental capacities. In fact, the testimony at 
the hearing was, both by the Respondent and the employer, that they thought he could do the 
job. 
Subsection 7 has nothing to do with how a final order of the permanent disability is 
derived, but merely determines how long payments continue when a person is permanently 
and totally disabled. Section 10(a) specifically states that if you lose the use of both feet, 
then that constitutes total and permanent disability "to be compensated according to this 
section." In other words, "to be compensated according to this section" relates back to 
7(a)(i) and 7(a)(ii). In no instance can the payments be made for a longer period of time than 
subsection 7 allows, even if the finding of permanent disability is based upon subsection 10. 
ARGUMENT 
I. In determining disability benefits, the Commission must 
consider and give effect to the entire statute regardless of how 
the underlying disability was derived. 
Intermountain's argument is really very simple: Under the plain language of the 
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Workers1 Compensation Act, permanent disability benefits are discontinued at the time that 
an employee is capable of returning to regular steady work regardless of the underlying 
disability. The issue in this case involves the interpretation and application of Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-2-413, and specifically subsections 7 and 10. 
Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents. 947 P.2d 658,661 (Utah 1997); see also Jeffs 
v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234,1240 (Utah 1998); Pappas v. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63,65 (Utah 
1998). In addition, "where the issue is a question of law, . . . appellate review gives no 
deference to the trial judge's or agency's determination, because the appellate court has 'the 
power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the 
jurisdiction.'" Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
The courts primary duty in interpreting legislation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). Additionally, there 
is a fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word in the statute. Provo City 
Corp. v. State. 795 P.2d 1120,1123 (Utah 1990). "In the process of interpretation, the courts 
may not take, strike, or read anything out of a statute or delete, subtract, or omit anything 
therefrom." Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. State Tax Comm'n.. 791 P.2d 511,516 
(Utah 1990). 
Subsection (7) is unambiguous and must therefore be applied in accordance with its 
plain language. "Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek 
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guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy consideration." City of South Salt 
Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1996) (quoting Gohler v. Wood. 919 
P.2d 561,562-63 (Utah 1996)). In our case, the statute could not be any clearer. Subsection 
7 provides how long payments continue when a person is permanently and totally disabled, 
regardless of the underlying disability and the basis of the final order of permanent disability. 
II. The governing statute plainly requires that disability benefits are 
discontinued upon death or at the time that an employee is 
capable of returning to regular steady work. 
Intermountain's argument is really very simple: under the plain language of the 
Worker's Compensation Act, permanent disability benefits are discontinued at the time that 
an employee is capable of returning to regular steady work. The issue in this case centers 
around the interpretation and application of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413. The Labor 
Commission did not even address subsection 7, but relied entirely upon §34A-2-413(10). 
In so doing, the Commission failed to apply the statute as it was intended. Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-413(10) provides that: 
(a) The loss or permanent and compete loss of the use of both hands, both 
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body 
members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated 
according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent and total disability pursuant to subsection 10(a) 
is final, (emphasis added). 
In reliance upon this section, the Labor Commission in its order denying the motion 
for review held that "Mr. Stephens is entitled to continuing permanent total disability 
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compensation." (R. 117). The Commission completely ignored and failed to apply the rest 
of the statute, in spite of the language that compensation is to be applied in accordance with 
§34A-2-413. In it's application of subsection 10, even though it calls for a final order to be 
entered, subsection 10 still states that benefits are "to be compensated according to this 
section." Subsection 7 of this section specifically deals with the distribution of compensation 
and addresses how compensation is to be applied. 
Our Supreme Court has previously stated that "the courts have a fundamental duty to 
give affect, if possible, to every word in the statute." Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.d 
1120, 1123 (Utah 1990). In addition, "in the process of interpretation, the courts may not 
take, strike, or read anything out of a statute or delete, subtract, or omit anything therefrom." 
Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. State Tax Comm'n.. 791 P.2d 511,516 (Utah 1990). 
The Commission's interpretation of the statute clearly omits and does not give effect to the 
statute as a whole. 
In the Motion for Review, filed by the Respondent's, Respondents specifically 
requested that the Labor Commission interpret the law and statute found in the Labor Code 
under the Worker's Compensation Act Section 34A-2-413(7). The Respondents requested 
that the Commission analyze Subsection 7 of the permanent total disability section and the 
amount of payments required to be made in the present case. (R. 104). 
It is Respondents position that the interpretation of subsection 7 has nothing to do with 
the underlying facts and the determination of a final order of permanent disability. Rather, 
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subsection 7 determines how long payments continue when a final order of permanent 
disability has been entered. The Commission's interpretation and application of the section 
would have payments go on forever, because there is no provision in subsection 10 that deals 
with the termination or suspension of benefits, even upon death. This is because subsection 
7 determines the period of compensation in all cases where there has been a final order. 
Subsection 7 states as follows: 
The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became 
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the 
commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
In accordance with the statute, compensation under a final order is to be suspended 
at either the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, 
steady work. This subsection specifically states that it applies to a "final order". It does not 
differentiate between a final order of permanent disability for someone that has a back injury 
and is found to be permanently disabled in accordance with subsection 1, versus someone 
who is determined to be permanently disable through the application of subsection 10. It 
applies to all final orders, and clearly there is no distinction made for the underlying 
disability. 
It is the Respondents' position that the interpretation of Section 7 has nothing to do 
with how a final order of the permanent disability is derived, but merely determines how long 
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payments continue when a person is permanently and totally disabled. Section 10(a) 
specifically states that if you lose the use of both feet, then that constitutes total and 
permanent disability "to be compensated according to this section." In other words, ,fto be 
compensated according to this section" relates back to 7(a)(i) and 7(a)(ii). In no instance can 
the payments be made for a longer period of time than subsection 7 allows, even if the 
finding of permanent disability is based upon subsection 10. Subsection 7 is unambiguous 
and therefore must be applied in accordance with its plain language. 
III. Suspending benefits in this case when an individual is capable and able 
to return to regular steady work accomplishes the purpose of the 
Worker Compensation Act. 
The Statute in its present form Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 came into affect during 
the year 1994. At that time, the legislature overhauled the whole statute dealing with 
permanent total disability. Prior to that time, an employer was only responsible for 312 
weeks of payments on any permanent total disability claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(1994). Thereafter, the payments were taken over by the state. The statute was amended in 
1994 to make the employers responsible for the lifetime of the injured employees. 
One of the major issues discussed at the time when the Statute was amended, was 
whether or not rehabilitation efforts should be made mandatory in the state of Utah. It was 
agreed that they would not be made mandatory, but sufficient benefits and relief from the 
lifetime payments were given if rehabilitation efforts were voluntarily begun. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-413. It was discussed at the legislature at the time of the passing of this 
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Statute that by providing the sufficient care, the employers would perform rehabilitation 
efforts on a voluntary basis because there would be some benefit for doing so. It was also 
recognized that the rehabilitation efforts would provide substantial benefits to the injured 
employees. Hence, the rehabilitation section was added to 34A-2-413 and the payments for 
permanent total disability claims was limited to 1) the lifetime of the employee, or 2) his 
capability of returning to regular steady work. 
The Labor Commission's interpretation of this statute does away with all incentive for 
an employer to provide rehabilitative efforts to the injured employee because there is no 
relief in providing such benefit. As stated above, the employer was paying for rehabilitation 
efforts which included paying for schooling. However, the interpretation of the statute by 
the Labor Commission eliminated any incentive for the employer to continue paying for 
schooling and all other efforts of rehabilitation. As a result of totally taking away any 
incentive for rehabilitation, and much to the disappointment of the applicant, the employer 
discontinued rehabilitation that they had voluntarily provided. As such, the Labor 
Commission order is clearly contrary to what the legislator intended when he overhauled the 
statute. 
It is a well known fact that where rehabilitation is possible, rehabilitation is the most 
satisfactory disposition of an industrial injury from the point of view of an injured employee, 
the insurer, the employer and the general public. See Larson's Workers Compensation Law 
§61.26. Based upon the changes to this section by the legislature, and the additional 
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language dealing directly with rehabilitation it is clear that the legislature wanted to 
encourage rehabilitation by the employer by providing the incentives to suspend benefits. 
The Respondents assert that is the very reason that Section 7(a)(ii) was specifically codified. 
This Statute is relatively new of that there is no case law that the Respondents are 
aware of which addresses this particular issue in the state of Utah. The Respondents 
respectfully request that this Court review the statute for the proper interpretation of law and 
issue an order reversing the Labor Commission's finding that permanent total disability 
payments must continue indefinitly, and find that benefits should be suspended if the 
applicant is able to return to regular steady work as in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents, Intermountain Surrly Seal respectfully 
requests that this Court overturn the Labor Commission and find that benefits should be 
suspended in all cases upon death or when the applicant is capable and able to return to 
regular, steady work. 
DATED this the 13th day of July, 2001. 
PLANT, WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
ROBERT C. OLSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disability - Amount of payments - Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational 
disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the 
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of 
the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability 
entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's 
ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent 
the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the 
employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that 
is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the 
employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional 
capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under 
this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant, may be presented to the 
commission, but is not binding and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum 
of four dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection 
(2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) 
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of 
injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 
through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance 
carrier by the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance 
carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 
weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or 
its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 
through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance 
carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the 
initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable 
by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee 
has received compensation from the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any 
combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total 
disability compeusation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the 
same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken 
pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge a reemployment 
plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the 
employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides the 
administrative law judge notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; 
and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any reemployment plan 
submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the 
employee's subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made 
under Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If 
the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections 
(6)(d)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job 
placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer 
or its insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the 
employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The 
employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be 
cause for the administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a 
final decision of permanent total disability. 
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the 
administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability 
compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and 
ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled 
employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum 
wage provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the 
employee from Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the 
reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided 
under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the 
employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess 
of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently 
totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset 
provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset, 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, 
Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically 
appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to 
undertake work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or 
for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as 
provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has 
been offered but the employee has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the 
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability 
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge 
shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law 
judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states 
specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, 
both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and 
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total 
disability claim, except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured 
employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains 
permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final, 
unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent 
reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with 
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per 
diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the 
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total 
disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's 
permanent total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that 
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the Division of 
Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by documentation 
supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer 
permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the 
Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be 
the sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the 
evidence of the employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under 
Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing with other evidence relating to 
the employee's status and condition. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable 
attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with 
respect to reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does 
not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys fees shall be paid by the 
employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total disability compensation 
benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each 
insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the 
permanent total disability compensation benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
History 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 116, § 4; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; 1991, 
ch. 136, § 12; 1992, ch. 53, § 2; 1994, ch. 266, § 2; 1995, ch. 177, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, 
ch. 240, § 156; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 121. 
Annotations 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1988, ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last amended 
by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating to permanent total disability, effective July 1,1988, and 
enacts the present section. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote the section to such an 
extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable. 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection (1) to include occupational 
diseases and add Subsections (b)(i) through (b)(iii), (c)(i) through (c)(iv), and (d); added 
Subsections (7)(b) through (h), (11), and (12) and the second sentence in Subsection (9); and 
made related subsection redesignations and stylistic changes throughout. 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared 
as § 35-1-67; and substituted "department" for "commission" and "chapter" for "title" 
throughout; substituted "this chapter and Chapter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act" for 
"chapter 1 or 2" in Subsections (l)(d) and (6)(b); substituted "35A-3-703" for "35-1-69" in 
Subsections (3)(a) and (3)(e); substituted "35A-3-410 through 35A-3-412 and Sections 
35A-3-501 through 35A-3-507" for "35-1-65, 25-1-65.1, 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7" in 
Subsections (3)(b) and (4)(b); substituted "Section 35A-3-114" for "Utah Workers' 
Compensation Fund Prevention Act" in Subsection (10)(c)(v); and substituted "35A-3-805" for 
"35-1-87" in Subsection (10)(g). 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared 
as § 35A-3-413 ; substituted "commission" and "administrative law judge" for "department" 
where the terms appear; inserted references to "Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" in 
Subsections (l)(d) and (9) and as a substitute for "Chapter 3a" in Subsection (6)(c); substituted 
"34A-2-703" for "35A-3-703" in Subsections (3)(a) and (3)(e), "34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412" 
and "34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507" for "35A-3-410 through 35A-3-412" and "35A-3-501 
through 35A-3-507" in Subsections (3)(b) and (4)(b), "Chapter 8" for Chapter 9, Part 2" in 
Subsection(6)(a)(i), "34A-2-110" for "35A-3-114" in Subsection (1 l)(c)(v), and "34A-1-309" for 
"35A-3-805" in Subsection (1 l)(g); added"is governed by Part 8, Adjudication" at the end of 
Subsection (7)(f)(ii); substituted "Division of Adjudication" for "department" in Subsection 
(1 l)(f)(i); inserted "as determined by the Division of Adjudication" in Subsection (1 l)(f)(ii); and 
made stylistic changes. 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Case No. 99648 
KYLE STEPHENS, 
Petitioner, 
vs, 
• 
• 
• 
* 
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL/ * 
CNA INSURANCE, * 
• 
Respondents. * 
FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
2ND HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on June 8, 2000at 3:00o'clock p.m. 
Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The petitioner was represented by Kevin Robson, 
Attorney. 
The respondents were represented by Theodore Kanell, 
Attorney. 
PROCEDURAL STATUS OF LITIGATION: 
On February 1, 2000, the ALJ issued Preliminary Conclusions of 
Law and Order in the above-captioned matter, concluding that the 
petitioner was entitled to payment of permanent total disability 
benefits, regardless of what his capacity was for returning to work. 
Although the ALJ allowed for additional legal argument on that statutory 
construction issue, relating to the award of permanent total disability 
benefits, the parties presented no further argument on that legal issue. 
A second hearing was held as indicated above, to address the factual 
issues surrounding the petitioner's ability to return to work. This 
Order addresses the facts related to the petitioner's ability to return 
to work currently and affirms the ALJ's preliminary analysis and ruling 
on the legal issue (addressed in the prior order). 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Soon after the petitioner's September 8, 1998 industrial injury, 
in which he lost both legs just below the knee, the respondents had a 
vocational rehabilitation counselor/analyst review the petitioner's work 
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background and skills. The counselor/analyst issued a report, dated 
October 12, 1998, Exhibit D-4, which concludes that the petitioner had 
potential for returning to .work with his prior employer, Granite 
Construction/Concrete Products and also had transferable skills that 
would allow him to perform work in a number of occupations. Apparently, 
sometime in 1999, the petitioner began going to college, taking courses 
in computer electronics, with the respondents funding this endeavor. 
The respondents indicated that they decided to pay for this 
rehabilitative effort, because they presumed that they would be relieved 
of the payment of permanent total disability benefits, once the 
petitioner was rehabilitated and returned to work. It is unclear why 
the respondents did not offer work or identify work for the petitioner 
instead. 
On September 28, 1999, the respondents offered the petitioner 
a job with his prior employer (Granite Construction, aka Concrete 
Products). This job involved primarily telephone work, per the job 
description submitted at hearing (Exhibit D-2). The salary level for 
the job is not indicated on the exhibit. About a month later, a second 
position was offered to the petitioner. This second position was a 
dispatcher position, paying $2,000.00 per month (Exhibit D-3) . It 
appears undisputed that the position could be performed from a 
wheelchair. The position is apparently located in Ogden and would 
require the petitioner to travel from his home in Logan to Ogden each 
day. The petitioner indicated, at hearing, that his disability would 
not necessarily prevent him from making the somewhat lengthy commute. 
The petitioner stated that he wants to keep his residence in Logan, 
where his extended family resides, as this family has been supportive 
and helpful in his recovery from the work injury. The petitioner's 
salary in his prior position, as of the date of injury, per the 
application for hearing, was approximately $3,200.00 per month 
($18.00/hour x 22 days x 8 hours/day). The petitioner stated that he 
was in school when the jobs were offered and he wanted to complete his 
schooling. 
After the ALJ issued her order on February 1, 2000, the 
respondents discontinued payment on the petitioner's college courses. 
The respondents indicated at hearing that, since the ALJ's order 
indicated that the respondents would be liable for permanent total 
disability benefits for life, the respondents no longer had any 
motivation for rehabilitating the petitioner. The petitioner was 
disappointed and confused by this discontinuance of payment of his 
college, as the respondents initially encouraged him to pursue the 
education. Previously, the petitioner had been attending college 
classes 2 hours per day, 5 days per week, with about 3-4 hours study 
time per day. The petitioner took a bus to and from his classes. 
Although he has a van with hand controls in it, so that he can drive 
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himself, the petitioner stated that the van does not run real well and 
probably needs a new engine, which he cannot afford. He stated that he 
was able to ambulate using a wheelchair, his prosthetic devices, or 
crutches. The petitioner wants to continue with his courses and thus 
he has arranged for payment of his education through the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services. 
The petitioner stated that he has been trying to manage without 
the wheelchair, as much as possible, using his prosthetic devices, but 
has been having problems with getting the devices to fit. He stated 
that his legs continue to shrink, causing gaps between his legs and the 
prosthetic devices. The gaps cause blisters. In addition, the 
petitioner stated he has begun to see a physician for severe back pain 
that is caused by use of the prostheses. The petitioner indicated that 
considering all the problems he has been having with the prosthetic 
devices, in order to return to work, he would need to rely exclusively 
on the wheelchair. He stated he would also need to be gone for a good 
portion of every work day, because he is currently getting physical, 
therapy for 1-2 hours per day. It is unclear if this would be 
accommodated with paid leave time. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The respondents argue that the petitioner is capable of 
returning to regular steady work and thus his permanent total disability 
benefits cease, as indicated in U.C.A. 34A-2-413 (7) (a) (ii) . As 
indicated in the ALJ' s prior order, the ALJ concludes that this 
provision for cessation of benefits does not apply to subsection (10) 
cases, involving loss of both limbs. If this analysis is incorrect, and 
the petitioner's benefits are subject to cessation per subsection 
(7) (a) (ii), the ALJ finds that the evidence of the petitioner's ability 
to return to "regular, steady work" is somewhat inconclusive at this 
point. At best, the ALJ finds that the respondents have identified one 
job that the petitioner MAY be able to perform. The ALJ has the 
following questions regarding whether the petitioner can perform this 
job: 
1. Considering the petitioner's recent development 
of back pain, can the petitioner manage the 
commute from Logan to Ogden on a daily basis 
and can the petitioner manage confinement to a 
wheelchair? 
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2. How much accommodation in pay and leave will 
the respondents offer, to allow for the 
petitioner's treatment needs (i.e. physical 
therapy and physician appointments, etc.)? 
3. Is 2/3 of his prior income sufficient to meet 
the petitioner's income requirements, 
considering financial needs he will have that 
will not be covered by workers compensation 
insurance (for example: the cost of a new 
vehicle, so that he can make the commute)? 
In addition to the foregoing concerns about the petitioner's ability to 
perform the job in question, the ALJ has concerns regarding whether one 
job position opening that the petitioner might be able to perform 
translates to capacity to return to "regular, steady work." The 
respondents have alleged that the dispatcher position is "generally 
available" in the work force. This may or may not be true (no evidence 
was actually submitted with respect to the general availability of these 
positions), especially depending on the number and type of 
accommodations that may be necessary to address the petitioner's 
disability and complicating factors, such as back pain. 
Considering the above-noted concerns, the ALJ finds that if the 
Commission, or other appellate body, should determine that the 
petitioner's benefits are subject to cessation per subsection (7), as 
the respondents have argued, the matter should be remanded for further 
consideration of the petitioner's ability to perform "regular, steady 
work," at the point in the future, when this case may be finally 
decided. 
BENEFITS DUE: 
Because the ALJ has determined that the petitioner is due 
benefits, regardless of his ability to perform regular steady work, the 
ALJ will confirm the award of benefits made in the earlier order below. 
Attorney Robson has indicated that he and the petitioner have decided 
that the full amount of benefits shall go to the petitioner until 18 
months following August 2000 (February 2002). After that, the 
respondents should pay the petitioner his compensation rate ($414.00 per 
week) less 20% ($82.80 per week), or $331.20 per week, for 110 weeks 
($82.80/week x 110 weeks = $9,100.00), or until approximately March 
2004, thereafter returning to full benefit payment of $414.00 per week. 
Attorney Robson can arrange for a lump sum advance payment of his 
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attorney fees (most likely involving a discount to present value) with 
the carrier, if that is mutually agreeable to the parties. As long as 
this is arranged per agreement, the ALJ will not need to approve the 
particulars of this advance payment. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Intermountain 
Slurry(aka Granite Construction and Concrete Products)/CNA Insurance, 
pay the petitioner, Kyle Stephens, permanent total disability benefits 
at the rate of $414.00 per week, beginning on date of injury, September 
8, 1998, and continuing until February 2002. Thereafter, to account for 
the attorney fee award below, the respondents shall pay the benefits at 
the rate of $331.20 for 110 weeks or until approximately March 2004. 
From March 2004 forward the benefit rate shall be returned to $414.00 
until the death of the petitioner or until further order of the 
Commission altering the award herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents pay Kevin Robson, 
attorney for the petitioner, the sum of $9,100.00, plus the percentage 
of interest that is appropriate per R602-2-4, for services rendered in 
this matter. This amount is to be deducted from the aforesaid award to 
the petitioner, in a periodic deduction, as indicated in the preceding 
order paragraph. The attorney fees are to be remitted directly to the 
office of Kevin Robson. 
DATED this 2 day of November, 2000, 
Bartfara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review 
with the Adjudication Division of ths Utah Labor Commission. The Motion 
for Review must set forth the specific basis for review and must be 
received by the Commission within 30 days form the date this decision 
is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion 
for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included 
in the party's Motion for Review or its Response. If none of the 
parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6TH day of November, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Settlement of Disputed Claim for Permanent Total Disability Benefits & Order 
for Approval, in the case of Kvle Stephens v. Intermountain Slurry Seal and CNA Ins.. (Case No. 
99648) to the following parties: 
POSTAGE PREPAID: 
KYLE STEPHtNS 
408 East 100 North, #1 
Logan, UT 84321 
THEODORE E. KANELL, ESQ. 
ROBERT C. OLSEN, ESQ. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & 
KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Ste. 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
KEVIN K. ROBSON, ESQ. 
5296 South Commerce Dr #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Vilma Mosier 
H.UUDGBVMOSIER\C«rifiaie 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
KYLE STEPHENS, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL * 
and CNA INSURANCE, * 
* Case No. 99-0648 
Defendants. * 
Intermountain Slurry Seal and its workers compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance 
(jointly referred to as "Intermountain") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative 
Law Judge's award of benefits to Kyle Stephens under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the 
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b~12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Pursuant to §34A-2-413(10) of the Act, is Mr. Stephens entitled to continuing permanent 
total disability compensation? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the decision of the ALL The facts 
material to the issue now before the Commission may be summarized as follows. On September 8, 
1998, while working for Intermountain, Mr. Stephens was run over by a heavy equipmenrroller, 
resulting in amputation of both legs below the knees. Mr. Stephens received compensation for his 
injuries pursuant to §34A-2-413(10) of the Act, which provides that loss of any two body members 
constitutes a permanent total disability. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2413(10) of the Act provides: 
(a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both 
feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes 
total and permanent disability, to be compensation according to this section. 
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(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection 10(a) is final. 
The foregoing provision has long been a part of Utah's workers' compensation system. It 
has consistently been interpreted and applied as creating a conclusive presumption of permanent total 
disability. Such a provision is relatively common among the various states' workers' compensation 
statutes. As noted in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §83.08: 
Special statutory provisions may supersede the general principles controlling 
the relation between medical and wage loss factors in determining total disability. 
The commonest example of this type of statute is the familiar provision that certain 
combinations of losses of members shall be presumed to constitute total disability. 
The presumption may be prima facie or conclusive. A typical statute applies the 
presumption to loss or loss of use of both hands, both arms, both legs, both feet, both 
eyes, or any two of these.... 
Under such a statute, depending on its wording, evidence of actual earnings 
would either be entirely immaterial, or would have to be extremely convincing to 
overcome the presumption. 
As previously noted, Utah's statute falls in the former category, where evidence of actual 
earnings is immaterial. Consequently, Mr. Stephens is entitled to continuing permanent total 
disability compensation.1 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Intermountain's motion for 
review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this o$ day of February, 2001. 
R. tee Elfertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
This does not mean that the parties cannot, by mutual agreement and with the approval 
of the Commission, enter into some other arrangement that commutes Mr. Stephens' right 
to continuing permanent total disability compensation in exchange for vocational training or 
some other reemployment plan. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Kyle 
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